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THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES*

George W. T aylort

D

IVERSE conceptions about the relationship between collective
bargaining and arbitration are at the root of some important
current problems about the use of voluntary arbitration to resolve
labor disputes. Should voluntary arbitration be considered, in any degree, as an extension of collective bargaining, or should it be basically
conceived as an alternative to collective bargaining? In other words,
does any part of the criterion of mutual acceptability-the very essence
of collective bargaining-carry over when-arbitration is invoked, or does
"arbitration" connote a process through which employment terms are
imposed upon the parties without any regard to the acceptability factor.
There is the nub of the most important current labor arbitration question. Nor can it be effectively dealt with as a problem of semantics and
by simply defining "arbitration" as a process which excludes the mutual
acceptability factor. That merely evades the difficult part of the
question.
At the outset, I want to make very clear my own view that either of
the two concepts just referred to may be usefully employed as long as
both the union and the management are in accord on basic principles.
Sometimes an "agreement to arbitrate" is incomplete, however, because
it masks a critical difference about the kind of process that is being invoked. May I also state my own belief that, as more mature collective
bargaining relationships develop, the parties themselves tend to adopt
that kind of arbitration process- in which mutual acceptability is a criterion of moment. I have long been perplexed about the insistence of
some lawyers that a conference between representatives of both parties
and the arbitrator "in his chambers" designed to secure "a settlement
out of court" is an unjudicial approach and not compatible with sound
principles.
The very nature of collective bargaining makes mediated settle"'Paper delivered at the Institute on The Law and Labor-Management Relations sponsored by the University of Michigan Law School, June 26-July 1, 1950.-Ed.
t Professor of Industry, University of Pennsylvania.-Ed.
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ments an even more natural objective than in most law suits. This
statement is no mere assertion. It is based upon three fundamental characteristics of collective bargaining which will be briefly discussed because they are vital to an appraisal of the role of voluntary arbitration.

Nature of Collective Bargaining
Whatever its precise role, voluntary arbitration of labor disputes is
obviously closely related to collective bargaining. Voluntary arbitration
must be agreed upon by both parties and either has an unquestioned
right to reject voluntary arbitration. Arbitration grows out of collective
bargaining and, since it is voluntary, may be looked upon as an adjunct
of collective bargaining. The following three characteristics of that
latter process may, therefore, well be emphasized in picturing the setting of voluntary arbitration:
First: Collective bargaining involves group acceptance by employees of the conditions of their employment. Union representatives speak
for a group of employees. Conditions agreed upon may not be entirely
acceptable to each and every worker. Individual interests may be, and
often are, subordinated to group needs. Let me hasten to add, however,
that conditions acceptable to each employee do not more generally obtain when individual bargaining prevails. In large·measure, the collective bargaining approach was adopted as a national policy because of
the tragic shortcomings of individual bargaining that became so manifest in the 1930's.
Many of the questions arising from the group determination characteristic of collective bargaining are far from resolution. With respect
to what matters should the individual interest be subordinated to the
group? Perplexing questions of union administration and of the subject-matter scope of collective bargaining are involved. These vital
questions fall beyond the limits of this paper. It should be emphasized
here, however, that the so-called individual grievance frequently involves a considerable group interest particularly when its disposition
gives particular meaning, connotation or substance to a term of the
labor agreement. Disposition of many of these grievances is a vital
aspect of collective bargaining. As will be noted later, grievance arbitration frequently involves much more than a simple application of the
terms of a labor agreement.
Second: Under what has been termed free collective bargaining,
management and union representatives are solely responsible for hammering out a meeting of minds about (a) procedures governing the
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conduct of the joint relationship, (b) the scope of the joint relationship
or, in other words, the subjects that will be dealt with through collective bargaining, and (c) the substantive terms of a labor agreement.1
The parties must agree about these and other matters.
Nor does a mere meeting of minds of the designated representatives
commonly suffice as respects the substantive terms of employment.
Terms agreed upon by negotiators must ordinarily be ratified by a
majority of the union membership before becoming effective. You will
recall, too, that management representatives in numerous cases made
their recent pension commitments subject to ratification by company
stockholders. Except as the conduct of joint relations and as the terms
of employment are now specified by law, our collective bargaining system makes mutual acceptability the principal, if not the sole, criterion
of fairness and equity in a negotiated labor agreement.
Mutual acceptability is, of course, the standard criterion for contract-making in general under our system of relatively free enterprise.
The collectively-bargained labor agreement, however, must be distinguished from the usual commercial contract. It is an agreement specifying the conditions under which the services of individuals will be contracted for. But, another characteristic of the labor agreement makes
it unique. There can be no failure to consummate a labor agreement.
There must be a meeting of minds. Unlike most other contractual
arrangements, the parties cannot eliminate any gulf between them by
the simple expedient of refusing to do business with each other. They
must do business; they must arrive at a meeting of minds.
Adoption of collective bargaining, with its emphasis upon compromise and agreement, as a governmentally-approved institution undoubtedly re8ects the absence of any universally applicable formulae, or of
commonly acceptable objective measurements, for appraising the fairness and equity of employment terms. The terms at which employees
as a group are willing to work and at which management is also willing
to offer employment are the fair and equitable terms of employment in
a collective bargaining system.
Third: The right to strike2 is essential to the collective bargaining
system. It has a function to perform. A desire of workers and management alike to avoid the risks and the costs of work stoppages is a strong
1 Each of these phases of collective bargaining has now been "regulated" to some extent
by the Taft-Hartley Act and "free collective bargaining" has thus been modified. There
remains, however, a vast number of problems in each phase which must be reconciled by
agreement of the parties and which can only be so resolved.
2 And also the right of employers to lock-out.
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motive power for bringing about the modification of extreme positions
which is necessary if mutual understandings are to evolve-and they
must evolve. Without a strong inducement for both parties to "make
concessions," agreement would be less likely. One may recall the enervation of collective bargaining during World War II when the "penalty" upon the parties for failing to work out a negotiated agreement
was not a work stoppage but a War Labor Board proceeding.
A meeting of minds-mutual acceptability of the terms of employment-is deemed to be so vital that, under collective bargaining, each
party is accorded the right to stop production. Why? As a means of
exerting ultimate pressures for a modification of extreme positions to
the extent necessary to make an agreement possible. In short, provision
is made for a final arbitrament by test of economic power. The results
of a work stoppage are not necessarily fair and equitable by some ob-jective standard. Nor is it required that the acceptance of terms by
each party be enthusiastic. But the terms must be mutually preferable
to a continuance of the work stoppage and the costs of idleness.
What it takes to avoid a strike or to settle a strike are often rather
fundamental criteria in the determination of conditions of employment
by collective bargaining. These may be appraised as harsh and unintelligent criteria. As a matter of fact, if they are not tempered with
reason and persuasion there is a strong risk that the costs of their use
will be deemed by the public to be excessive. Collective bargaining
could then be supplanted by governmental specification of employment
terms. The test of all democratic institutions over the years has always
been in the ability of people to exercise restraint in the use of their
individual and group power. The real test of collective bargaining lies in
the ability and willingness of union and management representatives,
in the great majotjty of cases, to reconcile their differences through
peaceful negotiations. Mutual acceptability of the terms of employment
has to be arrived at principally by analysis 9f the facts, persuasion, modification of extreme positions by one or both parties, compromise and
agreement. And the resultant meeting of minds has to embody a reasonable attention to public necessity.
The foregoing analysis of collective bargaining serves brieB.y to indicate the kind of a process to which labor arbitration ·is appended. In
many ways, collective bargaining is a unique institution. It is entirely
reasonable, it seems to me, to assume that, arising out of collective
bargaining, labor arbitration gives rise to problems that ar<=: also unique
as compared, for example, to commercial arbitration or to "litigation"
in general.
·
·
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Nature of Voluntary Arbitration
Voluntary arbitration enters "the labor relations scheme of things"
when the parties cannot directly agree but when neither wants to resort
to a strike or to a lockout to resolve the differences which must be resolved. The above comment applies not only to disputes over new
contract terms but to so-called grievance disputes as well. In years gone
by, the strike to resolve day-by-day differences arising during the term
of a labor agreement was standard practice. The arbitration clause and
the no-strike clause of the labor agreement were introduced complementary clauses.
Voluntary arbitration is a collectively-bargained substitute for the
strike. Use of arbitration need not indicate a "complete break with
collective bargaining," as is frequently assumed. Acceptance of arbitration does not necessarily evidence a final conclusion· of both parties
that a difference between them cannot or should not be resolved by a
meeting of minds. Acceptance of arbitration clearly indicates, however,
that both parties are unwilling to endure the risks and the costs of the
work stoppage which can be undertaken to bring about the meeting of
minds. If mutual acceptability is the- commonly approved measure of
fairness and equity in collective bargaining, how can it be lightly dismissed as a criterion when the parties decide against work stoppage as
the final arbitrament? What they say is that there will be no strike even
if a direct agreement is not achievable. But that can scarcely be interpreted as a conclusion against the desirability of an agreed-upon solution
peaceably arrived at.
Nor should it ever be overlooked· that voluntary arbitration comes
into being only if both parties are willing to accept this process as preferable to the use of economic power. If either party is "unsold" on arbitration to such an extent as to prefer a work stoppage, then arbitration
loses its usefulness in a collective bargaining system.
It follows, I submit, that arbitration should be developed to meet
the needs of the parties to collective bargaining rather than the needs
or doctrinaire notions of arbitrators, college professors, lawyers, or other
outsiders. Collective bargaining practices and procedures vary; so will
arbitration practices and procedures. In some industries, an arbitrator
who did not seek to get an agreed-upon "decision" would be considered by both parties to be incompetent. In other industries, both parties would react violently against any such practice as being incompatible with their concept of arbitration as a "judicial proceeding'' in which
the arbitrator must "decide" the case.

as
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There is no great dilemma as long as the parties see eye-to-eye about
the kind of settlement procedure they have created. When such an
understanding does not obtain, however, difficulties are often encountered. Acceptance of the principle of arbitration by the parties has,
moreover, rarely been preceded by negotiations about the details of the
process which is being substituted for the strike. In consequence, the
agreement to arbitrate may itself embody only an incomplete meeting
of the minds.
Such a situation may not be serious at all if the parties recognize the
responsibility of the arbitrator selected by them to decide any disputed
jurisdictional or procedural questions. The arbitrator then deals, however, with fundamental questions about the very nature of the joint
relationship between the parties. He gives substance to the arbitration
agreement. This is of particular importance in grievance arbitration.
One of the tasks of the so-called permanent Impartial Chairman is to
work with the parties gradually to develop the form and procedures of
grievance settlement that are mutually desired but seldom worked out
beforehand. The lack of a complete understanding between the parties
as respects the nature of the grieyance arbitration machinery has never
been overcome in some relationships where ad hoc arbitration is specified. It seems axiomatic to me that if the use of such ad hoc arbitration
is to be successful, it should be preceded by a detailed arbitration understanding between the parties.
There is enough dissatisfaction with arbitration as a substitute for the
strike as to call for a reappraisal of fundamentals. Is voluntary arbitration likely to prove desirable both to unions and to managements, over
the long pull, unless it is developed, with their joint approval, as a
process in which the meeting of minds and the mutual acceptability
criteria have a place? These two mentioned criteria (meeting of minds
and mutual acceptability) have different connotations in arbitration.
Meeting of minds implies a mediated agreement. Mutual acceptability
involves primarily the development of acquiescence by a "losing party."
Let it be clearly understood that by reason of neither criterion should
there be pressure for a mere compromise without regard to the merits
of the case. It is true that such a pressure may be exerted by strike or
lockout actions particularly if responsibilities in the use of such powers
are overlooked. But the old adage about "the lion's share to the lion"
is erroneously conceived both as respects direct collective bargaining and
arbitration. What we are talking about is the range within which the
terms of employment can be logically and reasonably determined. Mu-
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tual acceptability involves no mere compromise irrespective of the intrinsic merit of positions taken.
There needs to be a careful re-evaluation, too, of the premise of
some arbitrators that they somehow "represent the public interest" even
though they have status solely because of authority conferred by the
union and by the management whose duty under collective bargaining
is to compromise and agree. It is reasoned in some quarters, however,
(a) that arbitrated terms should be decided by reference to entirely
different criteria than are used by the parties themselves, and (b) that
arbitrated terms should be "imposed" by reference to what is in the
general public interest and without any regard to the meeting of minds
or to the mutual acceptability criteria. In other words, it is assumed
that resort to arbitration is implicitly a final determination by both
parties that no meeting of the minds is possible and that only by an
imposed solution can the dispute be settled. One observer who holds
this point of view has said, "In arbitration, one party must lose."
Certain advantages are claimed for such an approach. If arbitration, like the strike for which it is a substitute, is established as a costly
and as a risky proposition, then avoidance of arbitration may, like the
right to strike, induce negotiated settlements. By and large, this is a
rather "sophisticated" view that does not hold up too well when a "sour"
decision is being explained to union membership or to top management.
The view has pertinence, moreover, only to grievance arbitration actually set up in the contract. It does not apply to disputes over new
contract terms for which arbitration has not been provided in advance
of the impasse. There the threat of strike has not induced an agreement
and ad hoc arbitration has therefore been called into being.
It is also claimed that resort to arbitration implicitly constitutes a
deliberate choice of the rule of reason as expressed by an arbitrator as
preferable to the rule of force as exercised through a work stoppage.
Considerable weight attaches to that point of view. But no little difficulty is encountered in giving substance to the general phrase, "rule of
reason." Various objective and respectable criteria of fairness often
give widely conB.icting results. To a marked extent the parties themselves use such objective criteria to rationalize positions rather than to
formulate policy. The impossibility of devising commonly-accepted
objective measures of fairness and equity accounts in large measure for
the very adoption of collective bargaining. It may also be noted that,
especially in grievance arbitration, an imposed determination often does
not finally settle a dispute despite very erudite reasoning. A more criti-
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cal dispute for the next general contract negotiation may merely be
generated.
For the reasons just enunciated, and for others, there is a need to examine carefully the pros and cons of consciously developing the meeting of minds and the mutual acceptability criteria as an integral part
of the arbitration process. Can arbitration be viewed not as an alternate
system for fixing employment terms entirely foreign to the collective
bargaining approach, but as an alternative method for effectuating,
at least partially, the same criterion of mutual acceptability which has
been selected as fundamental to the collective bargaining system?
It is not implied that the imposed decision, "letting· the chips fall
where they may," is improper as long as the parties knowingly ''buy"
such a substitute for the strike. The danger is that the absence of commonly-accepted, objective standards of fairness will make the decision
imposed by someone essentially unfamiliar with the operating necessities of management and of the union seem arbitrary and so unacceptable to one side or the other as to make the strike preferable to voluntary
arbitration in future difficulties. In short, it seems likely that voluntary
arbitration will fall short of the needs of sound industrial relations and
of peaceful solution of labor disputes if it is developed strictly as a
process through which an outsider is requested to impose his judgment
upon the parties.
There is some evidence to suggest that union and management representatives have already sensed the desirability of developing arbitration
as an extension of collective bargaining. At any event, especially in new
contract cases, they frequently agree upon the tripartite arbitration board
with a majority vote required for a decision. Three-party bargaining is
thus substituted for two-party bargaining and the "outsider" has 'been
brought in to act as a kind of mediator with a reserve power. The
growth of the permanent Impartial Chairman, as differentiated from
the Impartial Umpire, to resolve grievance disputes is another indication
of the tendency to carry the mutual acceptability criterion over to arbitration. These types of arbitration, of course, bring their own problems.
In my opinion, however, they indicate a desire of union and management representatives actively to participate in the arbitration process if
that process is to be chosen over trial by economic combat.
Attention has so far been focused upon certain general considerations. I would now like to make a number of more specific comments
about three principal types of arbitration-of grievances, of labor agreement terms, and in public emergency disputes.

1951 ]

AlmITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES

795

Grievance Arbitrati.on

In evaluating the role of voluntary arbitration in labor disputes, it
has become customary to assume that there are two separate and distinct
types of arbitration: (1) the arbitration of new contract terms and (2)
grievance arbitration involving the application of contract terms to dayby-day problems. It is my considered judgment that such a differentiation has become so doctrinaire as to preclude a proper understanding of
the arbitration process. I do not at all imply that there are no differences
between the two types of arbitration. But I do suggest that there are
similarities and that the differences are not as ordinarily described.
An important key to understanding grievance arbitration is in realizing that while collective bargaining starts with the negotiation of an
agreement, it necessarily continues in the settlement of many grievances. They are the difficult gri~vances. Negotiation or arbitration of
grievances should not "add to" the labor agreement in the sense that
new basic terms are incorporated; nor should a clear agreement of the
parties be modified. During the life of an agreement, however,
grievance settlements will inevitably add important substance and significant meaning to the terms that are in the agreement. Grievance
settling, by its very nature, fills out the understandings expressed in the
contract which are inherently incomplete. Clear and unmistakable
answers to many day-by-day problems covered by a particular clause are
commonly not found in that clause. If they could be disposed of by
direct application of the clause, there would be no real reason to submit
them to arbitration.
Many industrial relations specialists-particularly in management
ranks-insist that agreement-making, and hence collective bargaining,
is limited to the negotiations for a formal agreement and that, thereafter, agreement terms are simply applied to dispose of day-by-day disputes in an administrative fashion. In no small measure, that position
reflects a management claim of possession of all directional and administrative rights except those explicitly ceded by the clear and unmistakable terms of a labor agreement. Management representatives often
argue that unless an employee grievance can be clearly and unmistakably supported by directly applicable words in the contract, management has retained an uninhibited right to do as it pleases as respects
that grievance. The trouble with such a view, advanced by management but not accepted by the unions, is that no policy is provided for
actually disposing of very real day-by-day problems in a satisfactory

796

M1cmGAN

LAw REVIEW

[ Vol. 49

manner. The consequences could include impaired employee morale,
wildcat strikes, and the accumulation of a vast number of "demands"
for presentation at the next contract negotiation. Imposed "settlements" of grievances are often no settlement as all. The hard facts of
the matter are that many contract clauses (1) cannot be written in full
anticipation of all the problems that will arise under it, (2) can best
be developed gradually in terms of a series of real situations, and (3)
need to provide Hexibility to the parties in dealing with day-by-day
problems.
Grievance settlement between the parties themselves involves collective bargaining, i. e., of developing a meeting of minds concerning
the terms and conditions of employment. This is because, even as respects the subjects covered, the labor agreement, in many respects, does
not and cannot constitute a complete meeting of the minds. The labor
agreement is skeletal. Substance is given to the subjects covered by the
manner in which so-called grievances are settled.
I do not mean to suggest that day-by-day questions are never determinable by direct application of agreement terms. Many of them are.
But they are the easy cases that seldom go to the final stages of the grievance procedure including arbitration. The difficult and important grievances are those arising under a contract term but for which no real basis
for settlement is embodied in the contract term. In settling such grievances, it must be admitted that collective bargaining is widely undertaken in the direct negotiations between the parties. Compromise and socalled give-and-take settlements of grievance cases gradually add up to
an amplification of and a substance-giving to the agreement term. Sometimes the cumulative effect of such grievance bargaining between the
parties is to amend, to modify, or entirely to change an agreement term.
So-called established practice often prevails as against an agreement
term when the two are in conB.ict. There should be no misconception
about the crucial collective bargaining that goes on between the parties
in the settlement of grievances.
What about the arbitration of grievances? Does submission of an
unsettled grievance to arbitration mean that the meeting-of-minds criterion of a sound settlement has been abandoned in favor of an imposed
settlement? The question needs to be considered in relation to the fact
that, as respects the crucial grievances, the answer is not to be found
in the explicit terms of the labor agreement.
There is another aspect of grievance arbitration which should be
clearly recognized. In most contracts, the provision for such arbitration
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covers future and unknown disputes. The agreement to arbitrate does
not usually follow an impasse over a particular issue. In consequence,
grievances may be submitted to arbitration because of their tactical or
face-saving implications. The flow of grievances to arbitration is dependent, moreover, upon the ability and the willingness of top union
and top management representatives to take issue with their constituents in turning back or screening grievances on the way up. It is all
very well to decry such practices on various obvious grounds. But,
it will be long before they are abandoned. For the present and discernible future there will be such grievances and some of them will be
submitted to arbitration. It may even be that the substitution of arbitration for the strike encourages the pressing of these kinds of grievances. If arbitration is to be on an informed basis, it must be able to
cope with them.
Grievance arbitration on the imposed decision basis-and particularly on the ad hoc basis-can produce some capricious results because the arbitrator is not likely to be aware of all the factors in the case
or of the manner in which a particular clause has been developing
through direct grievance settlements between -the parties. Especially
is this the case when the record is made by representatives who argue
to win the case rather than to solve the problem. Too often, an artificial case is presented rather than the real case which is bothering the
parties. At any event, all of you must have noticed frequently the
difference between the parties' statement of the case as formally presented and as privately discussed with "all the cards on the table."
Sometimes, the arbitration proceeding is something like a medieval
joust.

I hasten to say that such a formalistic method for settling grievances can conceivably be reconciled with collective bargaining necessities. But that requires a clear understanding by both parties that their
persistent differences will be settled by a method which will give results
unacceptable to one or both of them and sometimes unworkable. The
threat of such results should serve, like the strike, to induce agreements
and thus avoid arbitration. A series of unworkable and "unacceptable"
settlements, however, puts a severe strain upon the willingness of the
parties to use arbitration. They tend first to berate the arbitrator and
then to weigh wliether or not they would have been better off by resorting to work stoppages.
I like to think of the above-mentioned type of grievance arbitration
as the umpire type. In contrast is the impartial chairman type. This
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implies the use of a chairman who will be expected to work closely with
associates representing each of the parties. All participate in working
out a solution to a grievance. This is of particular value as respects the
settlement of those grievances which give substance to labor agreement
terms. It is the duty of the Impartial Chairman, as far as possible,
to achieve an agreed-upon solution or, if that is not possible, to gain
the acquiescence of the representatives of both parties in a decision he
must make. Emphasis is thus placed upon the collective bargaining
aspects of grievance settlement.
There are simple but potent reasons for such an emphasis. The
parties know their situation and its needs better than can any "outsider." A determination which both parties conclude is workable and
acceptable will be truly a 6.nal settlement. Never forget that a grievance
disposed of on some other basis can give rise to a critical issue in subsequent contract negotiations. And, many grievance settlements are every
bit as important as the essential negotiation of the very term of the
contract which is being "interpreted."
It has been suggested that the Impartial Chairman approach has an
important place in labor relations but that it is not arbitration. There
is a semantics difficulty which should not be gone into here. What is
important is that the use of the meeting of minds and mutual acceptability criteria in grievance arbitration is a notable characteristic of the
Impartial Chairman method which has been long used in well-established collective bargaining relationships. In my opinion, it is the
method for 6.nal settlement of grievances which is best adapted to the
institution of collective bargaining and which gives the greatest promise
as an "arbitration" substitute for work stoppages. At the same time,
I reiterate the conviction that, in the last analysis, the decision on this
point rests with unions and managements who bring voluntary arbitration into being and who will fashion it to meet their necessities.
Arbitration of Contract T enns

Arbitration, of one type or another, has been appraised by labor
unions and by management generally as preferable to strikes as a way
of finally settling grievance disputes. In marked contrast, these parties have been unwilling, by and large, to use arbitration to resolve disputes over new contract terms. Both parties usually prefer a work
stoppage in such cases. Why? Can it be that they recognize the irreplaceable nature of mutual acceptability as respects the basic terms of
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the employment relationship? Or to put the question in more usual
terms, how can either party afford to give an outsider, without stake in
a particular relationship, the power to decide "life and death" matters
for a union and for a company?
With the exception of one or two industries, the question of
whether to arbitrate a dispute over new contract terms arises only as
respects a known dispute. This is in marked contrast to the grievance
arbitration situation as previously outlined. For some time, it seemed to
me that the decided preference for work stoppages over arbitration of
new contract terms arose from an evaluation of relative risks and was
accentuated by a lack of development of the agreement to arbitrate.
Perhaps the risks of arbitration could be limited by a turning to "restricted" arbitration and away from "open-end" arbitration. In "openend" arbitration, determination of the dispute is on the basis of an arbitrator's own freely exercised judgment and selection of the criteria
as to what constitutes fairness and equity. These obviously vary. The
choice of an arbitrator whose views were well known could be tantamount to deciding the case. In what I term "restricted arbitration," in
their agreement to arbitrate, the parties instruct the arbitrator as respects procedures and even as to criteria to be used in deciding the case.
Altogether too little analysis has been made of the situations calling for "open-end" arbitration and those calling for "restricted arbitration." It would seem that a selection between these two types would
depend, partially at least, upon the kind of arbitration desired by the
party least desirous of avoiding a stoppage of production. As a general
proposition, however, it is likely that one-man arbitration of new contract terms will not prove to be generally feasible or widely acceptable
unless it is established by a detailed agreement to arbitrate, which limits
the authority of the arbitrator and provides guides for him. In shortr
the parties will seek to retain at least a measure of control over the arbitration process and not abdicate completely in the settlement of vital
questions.
In recent years it has become quite apparent that union and management representatives face formidable obstacles in agreeing directly
upon the details of a restricted arbitration. Yet they are desirous of
avoiding a work stoppage without losing all control over the arbitration
process. Out of these circumstances, an emphasis has been given to
"open-end" arbitration by a tripartite board which can decide the
issues in dispute only by a majority-approved determination. The creation of such a board connotes a conclusion of the parties that the arbi·
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tration should be a modified form of collective bargaining. In negotiations, the parties of direct interest have been unable to agree. But, they
are ready to have an arbitrator impose his ideas upon them only after
they have been tested in executive session discussions with partisan
representatives and only if the arbitrator can then get at least one of the
parties to "go along" with his ideas. And, of course, the most successful
result would come about by the issuance of a unanimous award.
The impartial man on such a board-the arbitrator--has an implicit duty to attempt to work out a settlement which can be supported
by both his colleagues. Those colleagues should understand the process, too, in order to participate effectively. The arbitrator does not
perform his function by simply deciding which of two extreme positions
presented will receive his support. Since the only possible settlement
in direct collective bargaining is a meeting of minds, a similar result
coming from a three-party arbitration board can scarcely be condemned
as inadequate. In the modified collective bargaining which is set up
with the establishment of a tripartite arbitration board, there is, moreover, a strong motive power for agreement between the representatives
of the parties that has previously not been present in the earlier negotiations. Since the arbitrator may ultimately have to choose as between
the two positions, there is reason for compromise and settlement to avoid
the risks of a decision by the arbitrator. One might logically say that
the arbitrator on a tripartite board has been assigned the role of mediator
with a reserve power to decide the issues in dispute by joining with one
of the partisan representatives.
In serving on a tripartite board, the arbitrator has been given no
authority to impose his unrestricted judgment upon the parties. His
judgment has status only if it is acquiesced in by at least one of the
partisan members. It follows that the arbitrator must be able and
willing to modify his views if necessary to arrive at a decision. This
presupposes that there is no one and only answer to a labor dispute.
At the same time, the arbitrator can be placed in a wholly untenable
position if both partisan members, despite the risk of a total rejection
of the position held, hold rigidly to their extreme positions and make
no "concession" to the arbitrator's views. Under these conditions, the
arbitrator can only decide which of two conB.icting extreme positions he
will go along with. If, in good conscience, he can vote for neither,
the arbitrator will then have no alternative but to withdraw from the
proceeding. Such a step is seldom taken. The very possibility is usually
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a sufficient pressure to induce one party to accept a final decision proposed by the arbitrator.
Much criticism of the tripartite arbitration board has been based
upon its "non-judicial" results although it is clearly set up to insure a
collective bargaining result. In this respect, such arbitration has certain
of the advantages and the disadvantages of collective bargaining. Frequently lacking, however, is the advantage of mutual acceptability to
both parties. Perhaps the most significant feature of tripartite arbitration is that the terms of employment must be acceptable to at least one
party. Avoidance of a feeling of "imposition" upon either party is the
most crucial duty of the arbitrator on a tripartite board. The constructive decision is one that has acquiescence of both parties, even though
one may dissent for the record.
My predilection for·the tripartite arbitration board in new contract
cases is held with full awareness of the difficult responsibilities of all
members of such a board. Partisan representatives may have to vote
for something less than is expected by the constituents. Their reluctance to do so has often resulted in decisions that are less than helpful.
Direct participation of the representatives of the parties in the proceedings, however, can provide the arbitrator with an understanding of the
issues and of practical solutions that are not otherwise obtainable. The
partisan representatives, moreover, know that each bit of evidence has
been evaluated and they are aware of the cumulative reasoning and
the procedures used by the arbitrator in bringing about a conclusion.
The shock of a surprise decision is obviated as well as the upsetting
response which such a decision can evoke. Tripartite arbitration has
many strengths as a substitute for the strike.
The compromise results of tripartite arbitration-and its accommodation to the needs of both parties when most constructively undertaken
-leads some critics of the process to insist that such a practice is not
arbitration at all. What is more important, however, is whether the
cause of peaceful industrial relations can best be furthered by use of
one impartial arbitrator, or of a board of impartial arbitrators, to decide
new contract disputes without the restraints that go with participation
of partisan representatives. In other words, would the parties be better
off by making a clean break with the meeting-of-minds and mutual
acceptability criteria of collective bargaining when they submit their
differences to arbitration? The hard fact of the matter, as shown by the
reluctance of unions .and managements to accept imposed decisions as
a worth-while alternative to a strike over new contract terms, is that
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voluntary arbitration of new contract terms seems to have a significant
future, only by use of the tripartite board and all that this connotes.
In summary of the discussion of these two types of arbitration, it
cannot be too strongly emphasized that labor arbitration is an aspect
of agreement-making. Although this is readily apparent as respects
disputes over the terms of new agreements, it is also applicable, for
reasons noted earlier, to grievance settlement. The unique characteristic of labor negotiations is that an agreement must be made; a meeting
of minds must be achieved even though the pressures of a work stoppage may be exerted to bring this about. It is, of course, conceivable
that both parties will agree that a decision imposed by an arbitrator is
preferable to a strike. They sometimes do. But, the collective bargaining tradition of acceptability is strongly entrenched in this country.
That is basic to the entire industrial relations structure. A recognition
of this fundamental principle in the development of labor arbitration
is entirely logical.

Public Emergency Disputes
Earlier reference was made to the function of the work stoppage in a
collective bargaining system. A labor dispute creates a public emergency when the strike cannot be permitted to perform its function because
it will bring the public to its knees before it brings the parties to terms.
In consequence, a work stoppage which creates a public emergency
often introduces greater pressures for governmental intervention than
for an agreement between the parties.
The possibility or probability of governmental intervention in a public emergency dispute can, under certain circumstances, serve to induce
agreed-upon settlements (including resort to voluntary arbitration)
but have also been known to prevent negotiated settlements. Much
depends upon the kind of government intervention which is likely
and whether a real or assumed improvement in position is anticipated
by one or both parties as a result of the intervention. One will readily
recall how contemplated government seizure of the coal mines in 1950
resulted in an immediate modification of the operator's position, and an
at-long-last agreement, following removal of the threat of injunction
consequences which had previously not caused the mine workers to
recede materially from their demands.
If labor and management would securely preserve their collective
bargaining rights, and if both are genuinely desirous of avoiding direct
governmental regulation or indirect governmental iniluence over their
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affairs, they will give more serious attention than heretofore to the use
of voluntary arbitration to resolve persistent differences which could
lead to public emergency work stoppages. However, a desire to obtain
immediate objectives by whatever means is always strong despite the
consequent enervation of collective bargaining. A clearly stated government policy for action to be taken in public emergency disputes can
easily solidify the negotiation impasse if either side envisioned a substantial strengthening of position through invoking the known governmental policy. The case-by-case approach of the government without
a precisely stated policy for intervention has, therefore, been recommended by some close observers who are desirous of maintaining the
collective bargaining structure to the fullest possible extent. Under
such a policy, it is reasoned, there would be a greater likelihood of
negotiated agreements or of volutary arbitration in the disputes with
public emergency aspects.
I have no doubt about the undesirability of compulsory arbitration
in public emergency disputes. Four characteristics of this process make
it particularly suspect. A compulsory arbitration program (1) does not
prevent public emergency work stoppages; it only makes them illegal
and inevitably interjects the government into a partisan position as respects the industrial relations controversy. (2) Required arbitration
must relate to future unknown disputes and thus tends to increase the
number of issues making up the usual labor dispute, (3) requires the
designation of employment terms through imposition upon both parties
and thus inevitably carries the necessity for sanctions, ( 4) requires the
specification of employment terms by "outsiders" who have no objective
criteria for their guidance.
How can a meeting of minds be achieved when direct negotiations
fail but when the strike cannot be used as the ultimate means of inducing or forcing the disputants to recede from their extreme positions.
As respects the public emergency disputes, there appears to be a fundamental defect in our collective bargaining theory. Government intervention is inevitable either to specify the terms of employment directly
or strongly to influence them by recommendations or required procedures. It is in this area that voluntary arbitration commends itself to the
parties who would keep the determination of employment terms within
their own hands to the fullest possible extent. For reasons expressed
earlier, the tripartite board of voluntary arbitration has a particular role
to play in the public emergency dispute over new contract terms.
I
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Throughout this analysis there runs the theme of the need for developing voluntary arbitration as an adjunct to and not as a substitute for
the collective bargaining process. It is indeed timely that careful analysis be given to this matter now when the goal of peaceful industrial
relations through collective bargaining is so urgently sought My hope
is that the thoughts expressed in this paper may be the basis for a discussion of this problem. They are not advanced as a doctrinaire answer
to those problems.

